Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation
In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles. First, we should not conceive children whose lives are n...
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley
2011
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1383/ |
| _version_ | 1848790595708911616 |
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| author | Rendall, Matthew |
| author_facet | Rendall, Matthew |
| author_sort | Rendall, Matthew |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles. First, we should not conceive children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we believe that children, whenever possible, should enjoy a certain minimum level of well-being. This is consistent with what is known as the sufficiency view. Third, we believe children should receive their fair share of benefits and burdens. It is wrong to take more than our share, even if we do not reduce them to disease or destitution, and even if they would willingly waive their rights. When groups are threatened with extortion, we often render their rights inalienable. We should do so here. The rights of our descendants are not ones we would allow them to “waive.”
These are plausible population principles not only toward our own children, but also toward more distant generations. In addition, they capture many people’s intuitions about animals. In the pre-refereed version of this paper (but not in the forthcoming published version) I develop an argument about the 'logic of the larder'. Some people argue that we do animals a favor by raising and eating them. I argue that here too we ought to ensure that as large a proportion as possible enjoy lives well worth living. In contrast to humans, most animals do not seek to accumulate beyond the level of sufficiency. Fairness requires only that their lives should be sufficient. The lives of many farm animals, however, are not sufficient. Moreover, much animal husbandry indirectly risks bringing both people and wild animals below sufficiency. By causing wild and domesticated animals to lead impoverished lives—and profiting at their expense—we take more than our fair share, just as we do from future people. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:07Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-1383 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:07Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-13832020-05-04T20:24:29Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1383/ Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation Rendall, Matthew In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles. First, we should not conceive children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we believe that children, whenever possible, should enjoy a certain minimum level of well-being. This is consistent with what is known as the sufficiency view. Third, we believe children should receive their fair share of benefits and burdens. It is wrong to take more than our share, even if we do not reduce them to disease or destitution, and even if they would willingly waive their rights. When groups are threatened with extortion, we often render their rights inalienable. We should do so here. The rights of our descendants are not ones we would allow them to “waive.” These are plausible population principles not only toward our own children, but also toward more distant generations. In addition, they capture many people’s intuitions about animals. In the pre-refereed version of this paper (but not in the forthcoming published version) I develop an argument about the 'logic of the larder'. Some people argue that we do animals a favor by raising and eating them. I argue that here too we ought to ensure that as large a proportion as possible enjoy lives well worth living. In contrast to humans, most animals do not seek to accumulate beyond the level of sufficiency. Fairness requires only that their lives should be sufficient. The lives of many farm animals, however, are not sufficient. Moreover, much animal husbandry indirectly risks bringing both people and wild animals below sufficiency. By causing wild and domesticated animals to lead impoverished lives—and profiting at their expense—we take more than our fair share, just as we do from future people. Wiley 2011 Article PeerReviewed Rendall, Matthew (2011) Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation. Journal of Political Philosophy, 19 (2). pp. 229-247. ISSN 1467-9760 Non-identity problem Sufficiency view Exploitation Logic of the Larder http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00378.x/abstract doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00378.x doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00378.x |
| spellingShingle | Non-identity problem Sufficiency view Exploitation Logic of the Larder Rendall, Matthew Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation |
| title | Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation |
| title_full | Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation |
| title_fullStr | Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation |
| title_short | Non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation |
| title_sort | non-identity, sufficiency and exploitation |
| topic | Non-identity problem Sufficiency view Exploitation Logic of the Larder |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1383/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1383/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1383/ |