The meta-ethics of normative ethics
This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive? In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue that co...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2011
|
| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12091/ |
| _version_ | 1848791430114312192 |
|---|---|
| author | Scorzo, Greg |
| author_facet | Scorzo, Greg |
| author_sort | Scorzo, Greg |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question:
Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive?
In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue that correctness conditions for moral claims imply the thesis of explanatory moral realism. I do not claim that this is an argument for the truth of explanatory moral realism. Rather, I claim that this is an argument that moral realism is a moral commitment. I then look at two objections to the claim that moral claims can have built in commitments to a meta-ethical theory that takes a stand on the issue of moral realism. The first of these is a set of arguments that Simon Blackburn gives for quasi-realism. The second objection is a set of arguments given by Ronald Dworkin that attack the presuppositions of debates about realism in meta-ethics. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:28:23Z |
| format | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| id | nottingham-12091 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:28:23Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-120912025-02-28T11:17:26Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12091/ The meta-ethics of normative ethics Scorzo, Greg This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question: Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive? In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue that correctness conditions for moral claims imply the thesis of explanatory moral realism. I do not claim that this is an argument for the truth of explanatory moral realism. Rather, I claim that this is an argument that moral realism is a moral commitment. I then look at two objections to the claim that moral claims can have built in commitments to a meta-ethical theory that takes a stand on the issue of moral realism. The first of these is a set of arguments that Simon Blackburn gives for quasi-realism. The second objection is a set of arguments given by Ronald Dworkin that attack the presuppositions of debates about realism in meta-ethics. 2011 Thesis (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en arr https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12091/1/Greg_Scorzo_PDF_Phd_June_30th%2C_2011.pdf Scorzo, Greg (2011) The meta-ethics of normative ethics. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. |
| spellingShingle | Scorzo, Greg The meta-ethics of normative ethics |
| title | The meta-ethics of normative ethics |
| title_full | The meta-ethics of normative ethics |
| title_fullStr | The meta-ethics of normative ethics |
| title_full_unstemmed | The meta-ethics of normative ethics |
| title_short | The meta-ethics of normative ethics |
| title_sort | meta-ethics of normative ethics |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/12091/ |