Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent
The point of this paper is to show that under a certain set of highly plausible circumstances, the well-known fiscal equalisation transfer required to establish spa- tial efficiency in federations, regional unions of states (such as the EU) or unitary countries with local governments, induces und...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
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Curtin Unviersity
2016
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| Online Access: | http://www.curtin.edu.au/research/crae/publications/working-paper-series/index.cfm http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/9634 |
| _version_ | 1848746006393389056 |
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| author | Petchey, Jeffrey |
| author_facet | Petchey, Jeffrey |
| author_sort | Petchey, Jeffrey |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | The point of this paper is to show that under a certain set of highly plausible circumstances, the well-known fiscal equalisation transfer required to establish spa- tial efficiency in federations, regional unions of states (such as the EU) or unitary countries with local governments, induces under-taxation of economic rents. The circumstances which lead to this result are carefully explained in the paper. It is also noted that the result does not invalidate the standard spatial efficiency case for inter-regional transfers. Rather, it means that whether such transfers are wel- fare enhancing in net terms depends on the benefit from achieving spatial efficiency relative to the cost arising from the under-taxation of rent. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T06:26:23Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-9634 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T06:26:23Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Curtin Unviersity |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-96342017-01-30T11:13:54Z Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent Petchey, Jeffrey inter-governmental differentials and their effects federal state relations intergovernmental relations federalism The point of this paper is to show that under a certain set of highly plausible circumstances, the well-known fiscal equalisation transfer required to establish spa- tial efficiency in federations, regional unions of states (such as the EU) or unitary countries with local governments, induces under-taxation of economic rents. The circumstances which lead to this result are carefully explained in the paper. It is also noted that the result does not invalidate the standard spatial efficiency case for inter-regional transfers. Rather, it means that whether such transfers are wel- fare enhancing in net terms depends on the benefit from achieving spatial efficiency relative to the cost arising from the under-taxation of rent. 2016 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/9634 http://www.curtin.edu.au/research/crae/publications/working-paper-series/index.cfm Curtin Unviersity fulltext |
| spellingShingle | inter-governmental differentials and their effects federal state relations intergovernmental relations federalism Petchey, Jeffrey Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent |
| title | Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent |
| title_full | Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent |
| title_fullStr | Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent |
| title_short | Fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent |
| title_sort | fiscal equalisation and the induced under-taxation of economic rent |
| topic | inter-governmental differentials and their effects federal state relations intergovernmental relations federalism |
| url | http://www.curtin.edu.au/research/crae/publications/working-paper-series/index.cfm http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/9634 |