| Summary: | In the second decade of the 21st century Russia-Gulf relations are experiencing a new renaissance. Over the past 30 years Russia’s strategic approach towards to the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula sub-region went through several major phases. Back in the 1990s, Moscow’s interest in this sub-region was limited-scale and economically driven. Under Russia’s President Vladimir Putin its national strategic agenda evolved from being modestly expansionist and non-confrontational in the early 2000s to a more aggressively assertive, ambitious influence building and impact driven towards the end of the second decade of the 21st century. For Russia, the sub-region is an area of strategic opportunity, where Moscow has political clout combined with established niche military-strategic and geo-economic positions. Russia maintains strong relations with both the Sunni and the Shi’i regional block, thus potentially giving it an edge as an external mediator and a power influencer. But could Russia’s recent political successes and strategic gains across the larger Middle East allow it to assume the role of a dominant external force, or will it continue to play a more limited role in the sub-region’s strategic affairs? This chapter will offer some critical reflections of the evolution of Russia’s engagement with the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula after the collapse of the Soviet Union; identify its current strategic interests vis-à-vis the sub-region; consider major socio-economic vectors which allow Moscow’s deeper interaction with it, and finally critically assess Russia’s capacity to expand its influence by exercising national military power across the Gulf.
|
|---|