When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data
In response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Western Australia (WA) introduced in November 2020 a mandatory contact tracing registration system and rolled out an online mobile application (the SafeWA app) which allowed users to easily check-in to venues at which they were required to register...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
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The University of Western Australia
2023
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| Online Access: | https://www.able.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/3693237/5.-Narrelle-Morris-and-Anna-Bunn-Page-162-192.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/92581 |
| _version_ | 1848765648926146560 |
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| author | Morris, Narrelle Bunn, Anna |
| author_facet | Morris, Narrelle Bunn, Anna |
| author_sort | Morris, Narrelle |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Western Australia (WA) introduced
in November 2020 a mandatory contact tracing registration system and rolled out an
online mobile application (the SafeWA app) which allowed users to easily check-in to
venues at which they were required to register their attendance. The WA public was
assured that their check-in data, including data logged through the SafeWA app, would
only be used for contact tracing purposes. Despite this, it later came to light that WA
Police had sought and gained access to data collected by the SafeWA app in connection
with criminal investigations. Following that revelation, and to address its potential to
undermine public confidence in the SafeWA app (and the contact tracing system in
general), the WA Government introduced the Protection of Information (Entry
Registration Information Relating to COVID-19 and Other Infectious Diseases) Act
2021 (WA). That Act, which came into force in June 2021, provides that entry
registration information can be used only for contact tracing and some other specified
purposes and cannot be used for general criminal investigations or law enforcement.
This article examines the legislative basis of WA’s mandatory contact tracing
registration system and highlights some of the implications for law-making,
parliamentary oversight and the rule of law which result from the use of subsidiary
legislation to effect significant controls over the public. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:38:36Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-92581 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:38:36Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | The University of Western Australia |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-925812023-07-18T06:30:15Z When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data Morris, Narrelle Bunn, Anna In response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Western Australia (WA) introduced in November 2020 a mandatory contact tracing registration system and rolled out an online mobile application (the SafeWA app) which allowed users to easily check-in to venues at which they were required to register their attendance. The WA public was assured that their check-in data, including data logged through the SafeWA app, would only be used for contact tracing purposes. Despite this, it later came to light that WA Police had sought and gained access to data collected by the SafeWA app in connection with criminal investigations. Following that revelation, and to address its potential to undermine public confidence in the SafeWA app (and the contact tracing system in general), the WA Government introduced the Protection of Information (Entry Registration Information Relating to COVID-19 and Other Infectious Diseases) Act 2021 (WA). That Act, which came into force in June 2021, provides that entry registration information can be used only for contact tracing and some other specified purposes and cannot be used for general criminal investigations or law enforcement. This article examines the legislative basis of WA’s mandatory contact tracing registration system and highlights some of the implications for law-making, parliamentary oversight and the rule of law which result from the use of subsidiary legislation to effect significant controls over the public. 2023 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/92581 https://www.able.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/3693237/5.-Narrelle-Morris-and-Anna-Bunn-Page-162-192.pdf The University of Western Australia unknown |
| spellingShingle | Morris, Narrelle Bunn, Anna When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data |
| title | When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data |
| title_full | When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data |
| title_fullStr | When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data |
| title_full_unstemmed | When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data |
| title_short | When Trust Fails Purpose: Legislative Lessons from Police Access to the SafeWA COVID-19 Contact Tracing Data |
| title_sort | when trust fails purpose: legislative lessons from police access to the safewa covid-19 contact tracing data |
| url | https://www.able.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/3693237/5.-Narrelle-Morris-and-Anna-Bunn-Page-162-192.pdf http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/92581 |