A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

In this paper, we consider a general form of linear-quadratic Stackelberg deterministic differential game model, which consists of one leader and one follower. Each of their utility functions includes all possible squared terms, cross terms and single terms of states and controls of the two players,...

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Main Authors: Li, Y., Teo, Kok Lay, Zhang, S.
Format: Journal Article
Published: 2023
Online Access:http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP190103361
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/91972
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author Li, Y.
Teo, Kok Lay
Zhang, S.
author_facet Li, Y.
Teo, Kok Lay
Zhang, S.
author_sort Li, Y.
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description In this paper, we consider a general form of linear-quadratic Stackelberg deterministic differential game model, which consists of one leader and one follower. Each of their utility functions includes all possible squared terms, cross terms and single terms of states and controls of the two players, and constant terms. The time-consistent state feedback form of Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is obtained. Its explicit expression is in terms of the solutions of three decoupled symmetric Riccati differential equations. These decoupled symmetric Riccati differential equations are independent of the state and can be solved backward in time one by one. The proposed model and theory are applied to some classical Stackelberg games
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format Journal Article
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
institution_category Local University
last_indexed 2025-11-14T11:37:58Z
publishDate 2023
recordtype eprints
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-919722024-10-08T04:31:59Z A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game Li, Y. Teo, Kok Lay Zhang, S. In this paper, we consider a general form of linear-quadratic Stackelberg deterministic differential game model, which consists of one leader and one follower. Each of their utility functions includes all possible squared terms, cross terms and single terms of states and controls of the two players, and constant terms. The time-consistent state feedback form of Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is obtained. Its explicit expression is in terms of the solutions of three decoupled symmetric Riccati differential equations. These decoupled symmetric Riccati differential equations are independent of the state and can be solved backward in time one by one. The proposed model and theory are applied to some classical Stackelberg games 2023 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/91972 10.3934/jimo.2022105 http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP190103361 fulltext
spellingShingle Li, Y.
Teo, Kok Lay
Zhang, S.
A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game
title A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game
title_full A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game
title_fullStr A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game
title_full_unstemmed A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game
title_short A New Feedback Form of Open-Loop Stackelberg Strategy in a General Linear-Quadratic Differential Game
title_sort new feedback form of open-loop stackelberg strategy in a general linear-quadratic differential game
url http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP190103361
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/91972