Female directors: Why are some less informed than others?

We find the limited supply of female directors, rather than gender differences or boardroom biases, can create an informational disadvantage for some female independent directors, as measured by their open market trading profits. The information disparity is largely isolated to firms with abnormally...

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Main Authors: Mobbs, Shawn, Tan, Yongxian, Zhang, Shage
Format: Journal Article
Published: 2021
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/89107
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author Mobbs, Shawn
Tan, Yongxian
Zhang, Shage
author_facet Mobbs, Shawn
Tan, Yongxian
Zhang, Shage
author_sort Mobbs, Shawn
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description We find the limited supply of female directors, rather than gender differences or boardroom biases, can create an informational disadvantage for some female independent directors, as measured by their open market trading profits. The information disparity is largely isolated to firms with abnormally low representation by female directors. Female independent directors who are located further away from the company’s headquarters, have less industry experience or have shorter tenure exhibit the most limited information access. Accounting for these obstacles reduces the gender disparity in information. We further find that this information disparity among female independent directors contributes to the variation in their influence on board monitoring. More informed female independent directors are associated with fewer restatements, lower abnormal CEO compensation and higher Tobin’s Q. Our results have several policy implications.
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-891072022-08-29T01:33:22Z Female directors: Why are some less informed than others? Mobbs, Shawn Tan, Yongxian Zhang, Shage We find the limited supply of female directors, rather than gender differences or boardroom biases, can create an informational disadvantage for some female independent directors, as measured by their open market trading profits. The information disparity is largely isolated to firms with abnormally low representation by female directors. Female independent directors who are located further away from the company’s headquarters, have less industry experience or have shorter tenure exhibit the most limited information access. Accounting for these obstacles reduces the gender disparity in information. We further find that this information disparity among female independent directors contributes to the variation in their influence on board monitoring. More informed female independent directors are associated with fewer restatements, lower abnormal CEO compensation and higher Tobin’s Q. Our results have several policy implications. 2021 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/89107 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101938 restricted
spellingShingle Mobbs, Shawn
Tan, Yongxian
Zhang, Shage
Female directors: Why are some less informed than others?
title Female directors: Why are some less informed than others?
title_full Female directors: Why are some less informed than others?
title_fullStr Female directors: Why are some less informed than others?
title_full_unstemmed Female directors: Why are some less informed than others?
title_short Female directors: Why are some less informed than others?
title_sort female directors: why are some less informed than others?
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/89107