CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power

We compare acquiring firms’ CEO pay with that of the highest-paid non-CEO director and investigate the influence of CEO pay disparity on takeover premiums and bidder performance. Based on a takeover sample of Australian listed targets and bidders during the 2002–2015 period, we find that takeover pr...

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Main Authors: Luong, Hoa, Duong, Lien, Evans, John
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: WILEY 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/85093
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author Luong, Hoa
Duong, Lien
Evans, John
author_facet Luong, Hoa
Duong, Lien
Evans, John
author_sort Luong, Hoa
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description We compare acquiring firms’ CEO pay with that of the highest-paid non-CEO director and investigate the influence of CEO pay disparity on takeover premiums and bidder performance. Based on a takeover sample of Australian listed targets and bidders during the 2002–2015 period, we find that takeover premiums are significantly higher if the deals are processed by acquiring firms with higher CEO pay disparity. Although these firms do not receive favourable immediate market responses to their takeover announcements, they outperform in the long run. We find no evidence that offering a large takeover premium harms shareholders’ wealth. Overall, our findings largely support efficient contracting theory in the Australian M&A context.
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-850932023-04-14T03:13:46Z CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power Luong, Hoa Duong, Lien Evans, John Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics CEO pay disparity Takeover premium Bidder performance Efficient contracting Managerial power We compare acquiring firms’ CEO pay with that of the highest-paid non-CEO director and investigate the influence of CEO pay disparity on takeover premiums and bidder performance. Based on a takeover sample of Australian listed targets and bidders during the 2002–2015 period, we find that takeover premiums are significantly higher if the deals are processed by acquiring firms with higher CEO pay disparity. Although these firms do not receive favourable immediate market responses to their takeover announcements, they outperform in the long run. We find no evidence that offering a large takeover premium harms shareholders’ wealth. Overall, our findings largely support efficient contracting theory in the Australian M&A context. 2021 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/85093 10.1111/acfi.12784 English WILEY fulltext
spellingShingle Social Sciences
Business, Finance
Business & Economics
CEO pay disparity
Takeover premium
Bidder performance
Efficient contracting
Managerial power
Luong, Hoa
Duong, Lien
Evans, John
CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power
title CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power
title_full CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power
title_fullStr CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power
title_full_unstemmed CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power
title_short CEO Pay Disparity, Takeover Premiums and Bidder Performance in Australia: Efficient Contracting or Managerial Power
title_sort ceo pay disparity, takeover premiums and bidder performance in australia: efficient contracting or managerial power
topic Social Sciences
Business, Finance
Business & Economics
CEO pay disparity
Takeover premium
Bidder performance
Efficient contracting
Managerial power
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/85093