| Summary: | This paper proposes an approach to categorize
electricity suppliers (ESs) for energy trading between ESs and a
single aggregator. A principal-agents game model is developed to
model the interactions between an aggregator and different
categories of ESs by considering the benefits of both parties. In a
proposed game, the aggregator as a principal will purchase a
certain amount of power from different-category ESs with the
cheapest pricing options available, and at the same time the ESs,
acting as agents will maximize their utilities by selling their power
to the aggregator instead of feeding the grid at a low rate. The
developed optimal contract-based scheme, which can be
implemented distributed manner, allows different-category ESs
to sell their power at different prices based on their unit
production cost to maximize their benefits, and the total cost to
the aggregator is minimized. Numerical analysis confirms the
effectiveness of the proposed ESs categorizing framework in the
development of a contract-based incentive mechanism for energy
trading.
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