Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation

© 2019 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand We add to the literature on the real effects of macroprudential regulation by investigating the novel link between a mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation. The mandatory disclosure stems from the Federal R...

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Main Authors: Zelenyuk, N., Faff, R., Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: WILEY 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/77007
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author Zelenyuk, N.
Faff, R.
Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize
author_facet Zelenyuk, N.
Faff, R.
Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize
author_sort Zelenyuk, N.
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description © 2019 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand We add to the literature on the real effects of macroprudential regulation by investigating the novel link between a mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation. The mandatory disclosure stems from the Federal Reserve regulation change of 2013 and leads to identification of bank intermediation effects with treatment methods. A combined empirical strategy of difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity design point to economically significant evidence for the reduction of both lending and on-balance sheet liquidity creation, for banks that disclose their capital adequacy as prescribed by the regulation.
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-770072019-12-02T03:43:10Z Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation Zelenyuk, N. Faff, R. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Social Sciences Business, Finance Business & Economics Asymmetric information Capital adequacy Bank lending Liquidity creation DISCONTINUITY LIQUIDITY INFORMATION INFERENCE VOLUNTARY COST RISK © 2019 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand We add to the literature on the real effects of macroprudential regulation by investigating the novel link between a mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation. The mandatory disclosure stems from the Federal Reserve regulation change of 2013 and leads to identification of bank intermediation effects with treatment methods. A combined empirical strategy of difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity design point to economically significant evidence for the reduction of both lending and on-balance sheet liquidity creation, for banks that disclose their capital adequacy as prescribed by the regulation. 2019 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/77007 10.1111/acfi.12536 English WILEY restricted
spellingShingle Social Sciences
Business, Finance
Business & Economics
Asymmetric information
Capital adequacy
Bank lending
Liquidity creation
DISCONTINUITY
LIQUIDITY
INFORMATION
INFERENCE
VOLUNTARY
COST
RISK
Zelenyuk, N.
Faff, R.
Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize
Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
title Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
title_full Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
title_fullStr Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
title_full_unstemmed Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
title_short Size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
title_sort size-conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
topic Social Sciences
Business, Finance
Business & Economics
Asymmetric information
Capital adequacy
Bank lending
Liquidity creation
DISCONTINUITY
LIQUIDITY
INFORMATION
INFERENCE
VOLUNTARY
COST
RISK
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/77007