Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures?
© 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. We investigated the unique corporate governance structure of Australian private equity target firms to establish the disciplinary motive underpinning a corporate buy-out and tested our expectations using a sample of 43 publicly listed private equity target firms and a c...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
2015
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76644 |
| _version_ | 1848763737848152064 |
|---|---|
| author | Clarkson, P.M. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Tellam, A. |
| author_facet | Clarkson, P.M. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Tellam, A. |
| author_sort | Clarkson, P.M. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | © 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. We investigated the unique corporate governance structure of Australian private equity target firms to establish the disciplinary motive underpinning a corporate buy-out and tested our expectations using a sample of 43 publicly listed private equity target firms and a control sample of 182 conventional corporate targets, matched by year and industry, for the period 2001–2010. The findings provide evidence of a less effectual corporate governance structure for private equity target firms. In particular, our analysis reveals that, relative to our benchmark sample, private equity target firms have larger boards, more board meetings and a greater inside ownership. Similarly, our results show that the probability of a firm being a private equity target increases with board size, percentage of insider directors, board meetings and CEO ownership. Consistent with results from work elsewhere, private equity target firms appear to perform ex post reactive monitoring roles rather than ex ante proactive roles. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:13Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-76644 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:13Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-766442019-10-22T07:55:09Z Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? Clarkson, P.M. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Tellam, A. Social Sciences Business Management Business & Economics Private equity corporate governance inside ownership board size FREE CASH FLOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS BOARD PERFORMANCE OWNERSHIP TAKEOVERS MARKET ACQUISITIONS CONSEQUENCES © 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. We investigated the unique corporate governance structure of Australian private equity target firms to establish the disciplinary motive underpinning a corporate buy-out and tested our expectations using a sample of 43 publicly listed private equity target firms and a control sample of 182 conventional corporate targets, matched by year and industry, for the period 2001–2010. The findings provide evidence of a less effectual corporate governance structure for private equity target firms. In particular, our analysis reveals that, relative to our benchmark sample, private equity target firms have larger boards, more board meetings and a greater inside ownership. Similarly, our results show that the probability of a firm being a private equity target increases with board size, percentage of insider directors, board meetings and CEO ownership. Consistent with results from work elsewhere, private equity target firms appear to perform ex post reactive monitoring roles rather than ex ante proactive roles. 2015 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76644 10.1177/0312896214539817 English SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD restricted |
| spellingShingle | Social Sciences Business Management Business & Economics Private equity corporate governance inside ownership board size FREE CASH FLOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS BOARD PERFORMANCE OWNERSHIP TAKEOVERS MARKET ACQUISITIONS CONSEQUENCES Clarkson, P.M. Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Tellam, A. Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? |
| title | Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? |
| title_full | Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? |
| title_fullStr | Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? |
| title_short | Do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? |
| title_sort | do private equity target firms exhibit less effectual governance structures? |
| topic | Social Sciences Business Management Business & Economics Private equity corporate governance inside ownership board size FREE CASH FLOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LARGE SHAREHOLDERS BOARD PERFORMANCE OWNERSHIP TAKEOVERS MARKET ACQUISITIONS CONSEQUENCES |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76644 |