Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’
© 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. The roles bank franchise value (‘skin in the game’) and CEO ownership play in determining bank risk are studied for large United States Bank Holding Companies. We find robust evidence of a convex relation between bank risk and each of CEO shareholding and franchise valu...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76642 |
| _version_ | 1848763737334349824 |
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| author | Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Haq, M. Williams, B. |
| author_facet | Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Haq, M. Williams, B. |
| author_sort | Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | © 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. The roles bank franchise value (‘skin in the game’) and CEO ownership play in determining bank risk are studied for large United States Bank Holding Companies. We find robust evidence of a convex relation between bank risk and each of CEO shareholding and franchise value, indicating that increases in each are initially risk decreasing, but as franchise value and CEO ownership increases so too does bank risk. Further, we find that low levels of franchise value combined with high CEO ownership result in managerial incentives aligning with those of shareholders, resulting in increased bank risk (‘going for broke’ or asset substitution). We argue that these results are consistent with those of Robert Merton, but in the context of franchise value rather than bank capital and deposit insurance, and accordingly offer some policy recommendations for regulatory monitoring of bank risk that are consistent with these results. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:13Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-76642 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:08:13Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-766422019-10-24T05:38:32Z Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Haq, M. Williams, B. Social Sciences Business Management Business & Economics Bank holding companies bank risk-taking CEO ownership franchise value managerial incentives RISK-TAKING DEPOSIT INSURANCE CAPITAL REGULATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE MARKET ASSESSMENTS CORPORATE-CONTROL INTEREST MARGINS PANEL-DATA COMPETITION INCOME © 2015, © The Author(s) 2015. The roles bank franchise value (‘skin in the game’) and CEO ownership play in determining bank risk are studied for large United States Bank Holding Companies. We find robust evidence of a convex relation between bank risk and each of CEO shareholding and franchise value, indicating that increases in each are initially risk decreasing, but as franchise value and CEO ownership increases so too does bank risk. Further, we find that low levels of franchise value combined with high CEO ownership result in managerial incentives aligning with those of shareholders, resulting in increased bank risk (‘going for broke’ or asset substitution). We argue that these results are consistent with those of Robert Merton, but in the context of franchise value rather than bank capital and deposit insurance, and accordingly offer some policy recommendations for regulatory monitoring of bank risk that are consistent with these results. 2016 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76642 10.1177/0312896214539818 English SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD restricted |
| spellingShingle | Social Sciences Business Management Business & Economics Bank holding companies bank risk-taking CEO ownership franchise value managerial incentives RISK-TAKING DEPOSIT INSURANCE CAPITAL REGULATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE MARKET ASSESSMENTS CORPORATE-CONTROL INTEREST MARGINS PANEL-DATA COMPETITION INCOME Pathan, Md Shams Tabrize Haq, M. Williams, B. Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ |
| title | Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ |
| title_full | Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ |
| title_fullStr | Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ |
| title_full_unstemmed | Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ |
| title_short | Does skin in the game help? Bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ |
| title_sort | does skin in the game help? bank franchise value, managerial incentives and ‘going for broke’ |
| topic | Social Sciences Business Management Business & Economics Bank holding companies bank risk-taking CEO ownership franchise value managerial incentives RISK-TAKING DEPOSIT INSURANCE CAPITAL REGULATION OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE MARKET ASSESSMENTS CORPORATE-CONTROL INTEREST MARGINS PANEL-DATA COMPETITION INCOME |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76642 |