State tax and policy competition for mobile capital
We characterise a model in which states engage in tax and policy competition with one another to attract mobile capital. The mix of policies chosen is shown to depend on the interaction between a desire to exploit capital for the benefit of domestic residents (labour) and a net marginal externality...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Published: |
Blackwell Publishing
2002
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/7658 |
| _version_ | 1848745433221824512 |
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| author | Petchey, Jeffrey Shapiro, P. |
| author_facet | Petchey, Jeffrey Shapiro, P. |
| author_sort | Petchey, Jeffrey |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We characterise a model in which states engage in tax and policy competition with one another to attract mobile capital. The mix of policies chosen is shown to depend on the interaction between a desire to exploit capital for the benefit of domestic residents (labour) and a net marginal externality generated by capital. It is also argued that competition between states leads to an inefficient supply and geographical distribution of capital within the domestic economy if capital markets are not fully integrated. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T06:17:17Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-7658 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T06:17:17Z |
| publishDate | 2002 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-76582017-09-13T16:05:52Z State tax and policy competition for mobile capital Petchey, Jeffrey Shapiro, P. We characterise a model in which states engage in tax and policy competition with one another to attract mobile capital. The mix of policies chosen is shown to depend on the interaction between a desire to exploit capital for the benefit of domestic residents (labour) and a net marginal externality generated by capital. It is also argued that competition between states leads to an inefficient supply and geographical distribution of capital within the domestic economy if capital markets are not fully integrated. 2002 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/7658 10.1111/1475-4932.00049 Blackwell Publishing restricted |
| spellingShingle | Petchey, Jeffrey Shapiro, P. State tax and policy competition for mobile capital |
| title | State tax and policy competition for mobile capital |
| title_full | State tax and policy competition for mobile capital |
| title_fullStr | State tax and policy competition for mobile capital |
| title_full_unstemmed | State tax and policy competition for mobile capital |
| title_short | State tax and policy competition for mobile capital |
| title_sort | state tax and policy competition for mobile capital |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/7658 |