The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring
The “Wall Street Rule” (WSR), a form of monitoring by institutional investors, has been viewed as a “cut-and-run” strategy adopted to express dissatisfaction with a company’s management. In this study, we show that WSR, far from being a passive protest, is in fact a potent weapon to improve corporat...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Conference Paper |
| Published: |
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/75435 |
| _version_ | 1848763480216174592 |
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| author | Chen, B. Duong, Lien Truong, T. |
| author_facet | Chen, B. Duong, Lien Truong, T. |
| author_sort | Chen, B. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | The “Wall Street Rule” (WSR), a form of monitoring by institutional investors, has been viewed as a “cut-and-run” strategy adopted to express dissatisfaction with a company’s management. In this study, we show that WSR, far from being a passive protest, is in fact a potent weapon to improve corporate governance. We present empirical evidence that WSR is positively associated with board monitoring when the firm is endowed with an outsider-dominated board. This suggests that WSR improves stock price informativeness, providing the board with an additional source of information so that it may monitor the company more effectively. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:04:08Z |
| format | Conference Paper |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-75435 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T11:04:08Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-754352019-05-09T01:08:44Z The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring Chen, B. Duong, Lien Truong, T. The “Wall Street Rule” (WSR), a form of monitoring by institutional investors, has been viewed as a “cut-and-run” strategy adopted to express dissatisfaction with a company’s management. In this study, we show that WSR, far from being a passive protest, is in fact a potent weapon to improve corporate governance. We present empirical evidence that WSR is positively associated with board monitoring when the firm is endowed with an outsider-dominated board. This suggests that WSR improves stock price informativeness, providing the board with an additional source of information so that it may monitor the company more effectively. 2018 Conference Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/75435 fulltext |
| spellingShingle | Chen, B. Duong, Lien Truong, T. The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring |
| title | The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring |
| title_full | The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring |
| title_fullStr | The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring |
| title_short | The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring |
| title_sort | wall street rule and its impact on board monitoring |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/75435 |