Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision
We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of politi...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Published: |
Elsevier
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/70164 |
| _version_ | 1848762231606476800 |
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| author | Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi How, J. Verhoeven, P. Park, J. |
| author_facet | Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi How, J. Verhoeven, P. Park, J. |
| author_sort | Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T10:44:17Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-70164 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T10:44:17Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-701642019-07-29T05:19:14Z Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi How, J. Verhoeven, P. Park, J. We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision. 2018 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/70164 10.1016/j.jcae.2018.07.003 Elsevier fulltext |
| spellingShingle | Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi How, J. Verhoeven, P. Park, J. Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision |
| title | Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision |
| title_full | Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision |
| title_fullStr | Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision |
| title_short | Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision |
| title_sort | political patronage and analysts’ forecast precision |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/70164 |