Political Patronage and Analysts’ Forecast Precision
We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of politi...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Published: |
Elsevier
2018
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/70164 |
| Summary: | We test whether the channel by which the government plays the role of political patron to selected firms influences analysts’ forecast precision in Malaysia. Correcting for analysts’ self-selection bias, we find a negative relation between analysts’ forecast errors and the social dimension of political patronage, as proxied by government-controlled institutional ownership. The reverse is found for the economic dimension of political patronage, as proxied by the percentage shareholding of government-linked corporations. We find no evidence that the personal dimension of political patronage influences analysts’ forecast precision. |
|---|