Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit

This paper derives and evaluates a mathematical structure for identifying economically-efficient transmission augmentations. The mathematical structure is based on the concepts of sequential-move and simultaneous-move games in applied mathematics. The Nash equilibrium solution concept has been refor...

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Main Authors: Hesamzadeh, M., Biggar, D., Hosseinzadeh, N., Wolfs, Peter
Format: Journal Article
Published: IEEE 2010
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/6239
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author Hesamzadeh, M.
Biggar, D.
Hosseinzadeh, N.
Wolfs, Peter
author_facet Hesamzadeh, M.
Biggar, D.
Hosseinzadeh, N.
Wolfs, Peter
author_sort Hesamzadeh, M.
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description This paper derives and evaluates a mathematical structure for identifying economically-efficient transmission augmentations. The mathematical structure is based on the concepts of sequential-move and simultaneous-move games in applied mathematics. The Nash equilibrium solution concept has been reformulated as an optimization problem in the proposed structure. The problem of multiple Nash equilibria is managed by introducing the concept of the worst-case Nash equilibrium. Both the economic concepts of the "efficiency benefit" and "competition benefit" of the transmission capacity are explicitly modeled in the proposed structure. A simple three-bus example system and Garver's example system are employed and modified to suit the purpose of analysis. A thorough economic study of these example systems is presented to highlight the concept and operation of the proposed mathematical structure from different perspectives. The results demonstrate the utility of the proposed structure for measuring the total economic efficiency benefit of additional transmission capacity.
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publishDate 2010
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-62392017-01-30T10:51:32Z Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit Hesamzadeh, M. Biggar, D. Hosseinzadeh, N. Wolfs, Peter power transmission economics power markets power system analysis computing game theory This paper derives and evaluates a mathematical structure for identifying economically-efficient transmission augmentations. The mathematical structure is based on the concepts of sequential-move and simultaneous-move games in applied mathematics. The Nash equilibrium solution concept has been reformulated as an optimization problem in the proposed structure. The problem of multiple Nash equilibria is managed by introducing the concept of the worst-case Nash equilibrium. Both the economic concepts of the "efficiency benefit" and "competition benefit" of the transmission capacity are explicitly modeled in the proposed structure. A simple three-bus example system and Garver's example system are employed and modified to suit the purpose of analysis. A thorough economic study of these example systems is presented to highlight the concept and operation of the proposed mathematical structure from different perspectives. The results demonstrate the utility of the proposed structure for measuring the total economic efficiency benefit of additional transmission capacity. 2010 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/6239 IEEE fulltext
spellingShingle power transmission economics
power markets
power system analysis computing
game theory
Hesamzadeh, M.
Biggar, D.
Hosseinzadeh, N.
Wolfs, Peter
Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit
title Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit
title_full Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit
title_fullStr Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit
title_full_unstemmed Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit
title_short Economic Transmission Augmentation With Explicit Modeling of the Competition Benefit
title_sort economic transmission augmentation with explicit modeling of the competition benefit
topic power transmission economics
power markets
power system analysis computing
game theory
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/6239