Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness
Proxy advisors are information intermediaries that provide voting recommendations to shareholders. Drawing on agency theory and the comparative corporate governance literature, we find that firm internal monitoring mechanisms substitute for proxy advice, and that proxy advice is less influential and...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Conference Paper |
| Published: |
2015
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/56051 |
| _version_ | 1848759773865967616 |
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| author | Sauerwald, S. Van Oosterhout, H. Van Essen, M. Peng, Mike |
| author_facet | Sauerwald, S. Van Oosterhout, H. Van Essen, M. Peng, Mike |
| author_sort | Sauerwald, S. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Proxy advisors are information intermediaries that provide voting recommendations to shareholders. Drawing on agency theory and the comparative corporate governance literature, we find that firm internal monitoring mechanisms substitute for proxy advice, and that proxy advice is less influential and has a lower predictive quality in relationship-based corporate governance contexts. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T10:05:13Z |
| format | Conference Paper |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-56051 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T10:05:13Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-560512017-09-13T16:10:39Z Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness Sauerwald, S. Van Oosterhout, H. Van Essen, M. Peng, Mike Proxy advisors are information intermediaries that provide voting recommendations to shareholders. Drawing on agency theory and the comparative corporate governance literature, we find that firm internal monitoring mechanisms substitute for proxy advice, and that proxy advice is less influential and has a lower predictive quality in relationship-based corporate governance contexts. 2015 Conference Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/56051 10.5465/AMBPP.2015.192 restricted |
| spellingShingle | Sauerwald, S. Van Oosterhout, H. Van Essen, M. Peng, Mike Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness |
| title | Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness |
| title_full | Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness |
| title_fullStr | Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness |
| title_short | Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness |
| title_sort | proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: a cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/56051 |