Board social capital and excess CEO returns
Excess CEO returns refer to CEO financial returns in excess of shareholder returns. How do boards rein in excess CEO returns? Introducing a social capital view of board monitoring, we suggest that boards face two competing normative pressures - corporate elite norms and monitoring norms. How boards...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
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John Wiley & Sons
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/50119 |
| _version_ | 1848758398633377792 |
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| author | Sauerwald, S. Lin, Z. Peng, Mike |
| author_facet | Sauerwald, S. Lin, Z. Peng, Mike |
| author_sort | Sauerwald, S. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Excess CEO returns refer to CEO financial returns in excess of shareholder returns. How do boards rein in excess CEO returns? Introducing a social capital view of board monitoring, we suggest that boards face two competing normative pressures - corporate elite norms and monitoring norms. How boards conform to such normative pressures for controlling excess CEO returns is affected by their external and internal social capital. Further, we substantiate our arguments by showing that powerful CEOs and institutional investors may facilitate or constrain the normative pressures existing in the social network and alter the effects of board social capital on excess CEO returns. Data from a sample of U.S. corporations listed on the Standard and Poor's 1,500 index from 1999 to 2010 largely support our framework. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:43:21Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-50119 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:43:21Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | John Wiley & Sons |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-501192017-09-13T15:37:02Z Board social capital and excess CEO returns Sauerwald, S. Lin, Z. Peng, Mike Excess CEO returns refer to CEO financial returns in excess of shareholder returns. How do boards rein in excess CEO returns? Introducing a social capital view of board monitoring, we suggest that boards face two competing normative pressures - corporate elite norms and monitoring norms. How boards conform to such normative pressures for controlling excess CEO returns is affected by their external and internal social capital. Further, we substantiate our arguments by showing that powerful CEOs and institutional investors may facilitate or constrain the normative pressures existing in the social network and alter the effects of board social capital on excess CEO returns. Data from a sample of U.S. corporations listed on the Standard and Poor's 1,500 index from 1999 to 2010 largely support our framework. 2016 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/50119 10.1002/smj.2339 John Wiley & Sons restricted |
| spellingShingle | Sauerwald, S. Lin, Z. Peng, Mike Board social capital and excess CEO returns |
| title | Board social capital and excess CEO returns |
| title_full | Board social capital and excess CEO returns |
| title_fullStr | Board social capital and excess CEO returns |
| title_full_unstemmed | Board social capital and excess CEO returns |
| title_short | Board social capital and excess CEO returns |
| title_sort | board social capital and excess ceo returns |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/50119 |