Principal-principal conflicts during crisis
This paper explores principal-principal conflicts in corporate governance during times of economic crisis. We address the question: What external and internal governance mechanisms can best protect minority shareholders? Drawing on 877 publicly listed large corporations with concentrated ownership i...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Published: |
Springer New York LLC
2011
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/49927 |
| _version_ | 1848758352133226496 |
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| author | Jiang, Y. Peng, Mike |
| author_facet | Jiang, Y. Peng, Mike |
| author_sort | Jiang, Y. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This paper explores principal-principal conflicts in corporate governance during times of economic crisis. We address the question: What external and internal governance mechanisms can best protect minority shareholders? Drawing on 877 publicly listed large corporations with concentrated ownership in seven Asian countries and regions, we compare different control structures between family firms and non-family firms during crisis. We find that family firms tend to choose certain control structures associated with potential principal-principal conflicts. However, these choices can be constrained by external and internal governance mechanisms. Specifically, legal institutions and presence of multiple blockholders serve as useful external and internal governance mechanisms, respectively, to constrain potential expropriation of minority shareholders. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:42:37Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-49927 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:42:37Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publisher | Springer New York LLC |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-499272017-09-13T15:37:02Z Principal-principal conflicts during crisis Jiang, Y. Peng, Mike This paper explores principal-principal conflicts in corporate governance during times of economic crisis. We address the question: What external and internal governance mechanisms can best protect minority shareholders? Drawing on 877 publicly listed large corporations with concentrated ownership in seven Asian countries and regions, we compare different control structures between family firms and non-family firms during crisis. We find that family firms tend to choose certain control structures associated with potential principal-principal conflicts. However, these choices can be constrained by external and internal governance mechanisms. Specifically, legal institutions and presence of multiple blockholders serve as useful external and internal governance mechanisms, respectively, to constrain potential expropriation of minority shareholders. 2011 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/49927 10.1007/s10490-009-9186-8 Springer New York LLC restricted |
| spellingShingle | Jiang, Y. Peng, Mike Principal-principal conflicts during crisis |
| title | Principal-principal conflicts during crisis |
| title_full | Principal-principal conflicts during crisis |
| title_fullStr | Principal-principal conflicts during crisis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Principal-principal conflicts during crisis |
| title_short | Principal-principal conflicts during crisis |
| title_sort | principal-principal conflicts during crisis |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/49927 |