Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour
Recent technology change and market liberalization have substantially reduced the costs of providing international message telephone services (IMTS). However, the full extent of these cost reductions have generally not been reflected in lower prices. This paper reviews the recent literature on int...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
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Oxford University Press
2001
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/46773 |
| _version_ | 1848757653898002432 |
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| author | Madden, Gary Savage, Scott |
| author_facet | Madden, Gary Savage, Scott |
| author_sort | Madden, Gary |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Recent technology change and market liberalization have substantially reduced the costs of providing international message telephone services (IMTS). However, the full extent of these cost reductions have generally not been reflected in lower prices. This paper reviews the recent literature on international telecommunications markets, and examines regulation and IMTS pricing behaviour. Particular attention is given to the accounting rate system (ARS), uniform settlement polices and asymmetric competition. Several market behaviour scenarios are described where regulation has resulted in carriers implementing inefficient pricing rules for both accounting and collection rates. Finally, economic and political strategies are put forward that could supplant the current outmoded and uneconomic ARS and bring about the full benefits of a freely functioning marketplace to telecommunications users. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:31:31Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-46773 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:31:31Z |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-467732018-12-14T00:54:41Z Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour Madden, Gary Savage, Scott collection rates regulation Accounting Rates competition Recent technology change and market liberalization have substantially reduced the costs of providing international message telephone services (IMTS). However, the full extent of these cost reductions have generally not been reflected in lower prices. This paper reviews the recent literature on international telecommunications markets, and examines regulation and IMTS pricing behaviour. Particular attention is given to the accounting rate system (ARS), uniform settlement polices and asymmetric competition. Several market behaviour scenarios are described where regulation has resulted in carriers implementing inefficient pricing rules for both accounting and collection rates. Finally, economic and political strategies are put forward that could supplant the current outmoded and uneconomic ARS and bring about the full benefits of a freely functioning marketplace to telecommunications users. 2001 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/46773 10.1093/icc/10.1.247 Oxford University Press restricted |
| spellingShingle | collection rates regulation Accounting Rates competition Madden, Gary Savage, Scott Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour |
| title | Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour |
| title_full | Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour |
| title_fullStr | Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour |
| title_full_unstemmed | Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour |
| title_short | Regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour |
| title_sort | regulation and international telecommunications pricing behaviour |
| topic | collection rates regulation Accounting Rates competition |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/46773 |