Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC
In this paper, we investigate the association between outside board directorships and family ownership concentration. Using a sample of 1091 firm-year observations of non-financial publicly listed firms from Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) during the 2005 to 2013 period, we find a positive associat...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Published: |
Elsevier BV
2015
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/43498 |
| _version_ | 1848756710739542016 |
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| author | Eulaiwi, B. Al-Hadi, A. Taylor, G. Al-Yahyaee, K. Evans, John |
| author_facet | Eulaiwi, B. Al-Hadi, A. Taylor, G. Al-Yahyaee, K. Evans, John |
| author_sort | Eulaiwi, B. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In this paper, we investigate the association between outside board directorships and family ownership concentration. Using a sample of 1091 firm-year observations of non-financial publicly listed firms from Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) during the 2005 to 2013 period, we find a positive association between family ownership and the number of outside directorships held by board members. This finding is consistent with the notion that family ownership reduces a board's monitoring capabilities. We also test whether the recent corporate governance reforms in GCC, which were designed to protect investors and minority shareholders, affect firms' incentives to establish a board nomination committee (NC). We find the existence of a board NC and the quality and characteristics of NC membership act to suppress the positive association between outside directorships and family ownership. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of outside directorships and family ownership and models that test for endogeneity. Overall, our results suggest that the institutional specificities of emerging economies such as those in the GCC can sustain high levels of multiple directorships, which could impair the quality of corporate governance. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:16:32Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-43498 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:16:32Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Elsevier BV |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-434982019-01-21T08:24:40Z Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC Eulaiwi, B. Al-Hadi, A. Taylor, G. Al-Yahyaee, K. Evans, John In this paper, we investigate the association between outside board directorships and family ownership concentration. Using a sample of 1091 firm-year observations of non-financial publicly listed firms from Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) during the 2005 to 2013 period, we find a positive association between family ownership and the number of outside directorships held by board members. This finding is consistent with the notion that family ownership reduces a board's monitoring capabilities. We also test whether the recent corporate governance reforms in GCC, which were designed to protect investors and minority shareholders, affect firms' incentives to establish a board nomination committee (NC). We find the existence of a board NC and the quality and characteristics of NC membership act to suppress the positive association between outside directorships and family ownership. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of outside directorships and family ownership and models that test for endogeneity. Overall, our results suggest that the institutional specificities of emerging economies such as those in the GCC can sustain high levels of multiple directorships, which could impair the quality of corporate governance. 2015 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/43498 10.1016/j.ememar.2016.06.004 Elsevier BV fulltext |
| spellingShingle | Eulaiwi, B. Al-Hadi, A. Taylor, G. Al-Yahyaee, K. Evans, John Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC |
| title | Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC |
| title_full | Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC |
| title_fullStr | Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC |
| title_full_unstemmed | Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC |
| title_short | Multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: International evidence from the GCC |
| title_sort | multiple directorships, family ownership and the board nomination committee: international evidence from the gcc |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/43498 |