Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government
A model widely used for decisions which have a public interest element is delegation of parliamentary authority to a bureaucratic agency, within the confines of a legislative framework which directs the relevant agents how social welfare should be maximised within the context of the issue at hand....
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| Format: | Working Paper |
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Centre for Research in Applied Economics, Curtin Business School
2008
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/40729 |
| _version_ | 1848755949240582144 |
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| author | Wills-Johnson, Nick |
| author_facet | Wills-Johnson, Nick |
| author_sort | Wills-Johnson, Nick |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | A model widely used for decisions which have a public interest element is delegation of parliamentary authority to a bureaucratic agency, within the confines of a legislative framework which directs the relevant agents how social welfare should be maximised within the context of the issue at hand. This is intended to remove the politicisation of decision-making, and allow for an objective approach. However, except in very limited circumstances, it is unlikely that bureaucratic agents will be able to act in this fashion. Using Arrow?s (1950) Impossibility Theorem, this paper outlines why this is the case, and the consequences of delegation. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:04:26Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-40729 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T09:04:26Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publisher | Centre for Research in Applied Economics, Curtin Business School |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-407292017-01-30T14:45:06Z Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government Wills-Johnson, Nick A model widely used for decisions which have a public interest element is delegation of parliamentary authority to a bureaucratic agency, within the confines of a legislative framework which directs the relevant agents how social welfare should be maximised within the context of the issue at hand. This is intended to remove the politicisation of decision-making, and allow for an objective approach. However, except in very limited circumstances, it is unlikely that bureaucratic agents will be able to act in this fashion. Using Arrow?s (1950) Impossibility Theorem, this paper outlines why this is the case, and the consequences of delegation. 2008 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/40729 Centre for Research in Applied Economics, Curtin Business School fulltext |
| spellingShingle | Wills-Johnson, Nick Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government |
| title | Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government |
| title_full | Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government |
| title_fullStr | Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government |
| title_full_unstemmed | Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government |
| title_short | Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government |
| title_sort | delegation or abrogation: the impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/40729 |