Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs

This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings (IPOs). Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center (GTA-RSC) databases, t...

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Main Authors: Fauzi, Fitriya, Basyith, A., Hewa-Wellalage, N., Wang, G.
Format: Journal Article
Published: David Publishing Co., Inc. 2013
Online Access:http://www.davidpublishing.com/davidpublishing/Upfile/10/22/2013/2013102272131073.pdf
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/39184
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author Fauzi, Fitriya
Basyith, A.
Hewa-Wellalage, N.
Wang, G.
author_facet Fauzi, Fitriya
Basyith, A.
Hewa-Wellalage, N.
Wang, G.
author_sort Fauzi, Fitriya
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings (IPOs). Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center (GTA-RSC) databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins’ Q and return on assets (ROA), and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis (PCA). Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only hetroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins’ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins’ Q is the generalised least squre (GLS) and the ordinary least square (OLS) between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins’ Q reveals that managerial ntrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-391842017-02-20T01:08:43Z Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs Fauzi, Fitriya Basyith, A. Hewa-Wellalage, N. Wang, G. This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings (IPOs). Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center (GTA-RSC) databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins’ Q and return on assets (ROA), and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis (PCA). Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only hetroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins’ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins’ Q is the generalised least squre (GLS) and the ordinary least square (OLS) between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins’ Q reveals that managerial ntrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions. 2013 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/39184 http://www.davidpublishing.com/davidpublishing/Upfile/10/22/2013/2013102272131073.pdf David Publishing Co., Inc. restricted
spellingShingle Fauzi, Fitriya
Basyith, A.
Hewa-Wellalage, N.
Wang, G.
Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs
title Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs
title_full Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs
title_fullStr Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs
title_full_unstemmed Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs
title_short Entrenched board in new public firms: An empirical study of Chinese IPOs
title_sort entrenched board in new public firms: an empirical study of chinese ipos
url http://www.davidpublishing.com/davidpublishing/Upfile/10/22/2013/2013102272131073.pdf
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/39184