The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board

Using a sample of 134 announcements of an executive joining the board of another company from 1985 through 1997, we find a negative announcement date stock response of about one-half of one percent for the home firm. Our initial regression analysis shows that the prior performance of the home firm,...

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Main Authors: Byrd, J., Martin, A., Rath, Subhrendu
Format: Working Paper
Published: School of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School 2008
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35382
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author Byrd, J.
Martin, A.
Rath, Subhrendu
author_facet Byrd, J.
Martin, A.
Rath, Subhrendu
author_sort Byrd, J.
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description Using a sample of 134 announcements of an executive joining the board of another company from 1985 through 1997, we find a negative announcement date stock response of about one-half of one percent for the home firm. Our initial regression analysis shows that the prior performance of the home firm, how close the executive is to retirement, and the number of other boards the executive already sits on, help explain the cross-sectional variation in the announcement date stock returns. The stock price response we report is larger (more negative) than that found by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) during an earlier sample period. We attribute the difference in our findings to investors being much more attuned to corporate governance issues during our sample period.
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-353822017-01-30T13:49:22Z The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board Byrd, J. Martin, A. Rath, Subhrendu Using a sample of 134 announcements of an executive joining the board of another company from 1985 through 1997, we find a negative announcement date stock response of about one-half of one percent for the home firm. Our initial regression analysis shows that the prior performance of the home firm, how close the executive is to retirement, and the number of other boards the executive already sits on, help explain the cross-sectional variation in the announcement date stock returns. The stock price response we report is larger (more negative) than that found by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) during an earlier sample period. We attribute the difference in our findings to investors being much more attuned to corporate governance issues during our sample period. 2008 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35382 School of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School fulltext
spellingShingle Byrd, J.
Martin, A.
Rath, Subhrendu
The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board
title The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board
title_full The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board
title_fullStr The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board
title_full_unstemmed The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board
title_short The shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board
title_sort shareholder wealth effects of an executive joining another company's board
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35382