Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents

In a modern economy there is a compelling case why governments should not own property rights to mineral deposits. Assuming they do, however, governments will use these constitution rights to raise revenue. They have two basic instruments to achieve this; a royalty charge on price or a rent tax on i...

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Main Authors: Mather, Diarmid, Saavedra, Jose, Kilian Polanco, Roberto
Other Authors: M Goodz
Format: Conference Paper
Published: Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 2010
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35047
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author Mather, Diarmid
Saavedra, Jose
Kilian Polanco, Roberto
author2 M Goodz
author_facet M Goodz
Mather, Diarmid
Saavedra, Jose
Kilian Polanco, Roberto
author_sort Mather, Diarmid
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description In a modern economy there is a compelling case why governments should not own property rights to mineral deposits. Assuming they do, however, governments will use these constitution rights to raise revenue. They have two basic instruments to achieve this; a royalty charge on price or a rent tax on income/profits. On the one hand, a royalty charge creates a ‘deadweight loss’ to society by increasing cut-off grades and decreasing the life-of-mine. They are also regressive. However, they are easy to administer. On the other hand, a rent tax avoids the problem of ‘deadweight loss’; it does not impact on the life-of-mine because the tax structure is neutral. But, they aredifficult to administer correctly, particularly in the determination of rents and the defi nition of mining per se. If rents are incorrectly determined capital markets are distorted. And, if mining activities are incorrectly defined, downstream activities could be adversely affected.
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-350472017-01-30T13:47:24Z Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents Mather, Diarmid Saavedra, Jose Kilian Polanco, Roberto M Goodz mineral royalty Mineral property In a modern economy there is a compelling case why governments should not own property rights to mineral deposits. Assuming they do, however, governments will use these constitution rights to raise revenue. They have two basic instruments to achieve this; a royalty charge on price or a rent tax on income/profits. On the one hand, a royalty charge creates a ‘deadweight loss’ to society by increasing cut-off grades and decreasing the life-of-mine. They are also regressive. However, they are easy to administer. On the other hand, a rent tax avoids the problem of ‘deadweight loss’; it does not impact on the life-of-mine because the tax structure is neutral. But, they aredifficult to administer correctly, particularly in the determination of rents and the defi nition of mining per se. If rents are incorrectly determined capital markets are distorted. And, if mining activities are incorrectly defined, downstream activities could be adversely affected. 2010 Conference Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35047 Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy fulltext
spellingShingle mineral royalty
Mineral property
Mather, Diarmid
Saavedra, Jose
Kilian Polanco, Roberto
Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents
title Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents
title_full Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents
title_fullStr Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents
title_full_unstemmed Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents
title_short Mineral property - Rights, Royalties and Rents
title_sort mineral property - rights, royalties and rents
topic mineral royalty
Mineral property
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35047