Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice

This paper considers remuneration in terms of a good that helps improve or facilitate production in an agency paradigm. In the presence of this production externality, agency problems arise when the agent has an access to an external market for the good or has private, pre-contract information about...

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Main Author: Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
Format: Journal Article
Published: Elsevier Ltd 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/33686
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author Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
author_facet Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
author_sort Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description This paper considers remuneration in terms of a good that helps improve or facilitate production in an agency paradigm. In the presence of this production externality, agency problems arise when the agent has an access to an external market for the good or has private, pre-contract information about the production environment. This paper characterises the optimal compensation packages in a variety of settings. The research findings explain various pay practices, such as payment in terms of reimbursement for a certain good and the selective payment of non-cash compensation.
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
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publishDate 2012
publisher Elsevier Ltd
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-336862017-09-13T15:32:48Z Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice Adithipyangkul, Pattarin This paper considers remuneration in terms of a good that helps improve or facilitate production in an agency paradigm. In the presence of this production externality, agency problems arise when the agent has an access to an external market for the good or has private, pre-contract information about the production environment. This paper characterises the optimal compensation packages in a variety of settings. The research findings explain various pay practices, such as payment in terms of reimbursement for a certain good and the selective payment of non-cash compensation. 2012 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/33686 10.1016/j.jcae.2012.07.001 Elsevier Ltd restricted
spellingShingle Adithipyangkul, Pattarin
Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice
title Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice
title_full Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice
title_fullStr Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice
title_full_unstemmed Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice
title_short Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice
title_sort non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent's consumption choice
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/33686