Decentralized emission standards with tax competition
We consider a game between jurisdictions within a national economy. Capital migrates between jurisdictions to satisfy an equal return condition. The total supply of capital to the economy is a non-decreasing function of the national return. This allows us to cater for the case where capital has some...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
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School of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School
2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/3060 |
| _version_ | 1848744126916329472 |
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| author | Petchey, Jeffrey Dean |
| author_facet | Petchey, Jeffrey Dean |
| author_sort | Petchey, Jeffrey Dean |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We consider a game between jurisdictions within a national economy. Capital migrates between jurisdictions to satisfy an equal return condition. The total supply of capital to the economy is a non-decreasing function of the national return. This allows us to cater for the case where capital has some home bias and jurisdictions have an incentive to engage in tax competition and set non-zero capital taxes in equilibrium. We then show that this competition does not distort emissions standards and that decentralized provision of environmental policy is locally efficient. Thus, we find no evidence of a race to the bottom or top in emissions standards as a result of tax competition. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T05:56:31Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-3060 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T05:56:31Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | School of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-30602017-01-30T10:28:18Z Decentralized emission standards with tax competition Petchey, Jeffrey Dean standards capital tax local public goods Emissions decentralization We consider a game between jurisdictions within a national economy. Capital migrates between jurisdictions to satisfy an equal return condition. The total supply of capital to the economy is a non-decreasing function of the national return. This allows us to cater for the case where capital has some home bias and jurisdictions have an incentive to engage in tax competition and set non-zero capital taxes in equilibrium. We then show that this competition does not distort emissions standards and that decentralized provision of environmental policy is locally efficient. Thus, we find no evidence of a race to the bottom or top in emissions standards as a result of tax competition. 2009 Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/3060 School of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School fulltext |
| spellingShingle | standards capital tax local public goods Emissions decentralization Petchey, Jeffrey Dean Decentralized emission standards with tax competition |
| title | Decentralized emission standards with tax competition |
| title_full | Decentralized emission standards with tax competition |
| title_fullStr | Decentralized emission standards with tax competition |
| title_full_unstemmed | Decentralized emission standards with tax competition |
| title_short | Decentralized emission standards with tax competition |
| title_sort | decentralized emission standards with tax competition |
| topic | standards capital tax local public goods Emissions decentralization |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/3060 |