The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
This article examines the prices paid for 700 MHz licenses in recent Federal Communications Commission auctions. Econometric modelling confirms the presence of economies of scale and scope in wireless spectrum valuations. That is, higher prices are recorded for areas with large populations, whilst l...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/25169 |
| _version_ | 1848751633123508224 |
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| author | Madden, Gary Bohlin, E. Kraipornsak, P. Tran, Thien |
| author_facet | Madden, Gary Bohlin, E. Kraipornsak, P. Tran, Thien |
| author_sort | Madden, Gary |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This article examines the prices paid for 700 MHz licenses in recent Federal Communications Commission auctions. Econometric modelling confirms the presence of economies of scale and scope in wireless spectrum valuations. That is, higher prices are recorded for areas with large populations, whilst lower prices are realized for geographically large areas. Also, smaller geographic license areas appear to meet bidders’ demand more effectively, and licenses in areas with high incomes are sold at higher prices. Not surprisingly, more strict deployment requirements and the presence of harmful technical interference reduce prices. Also, paired spectrum receives higher prices than unpaired spectrum. Interestingly, high minimum opening bids and upfront deposits are associated with higher prices. Finally, competitive bidding places upward pressure on prices. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T07:55:49Z |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-25169 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T07:55:49Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-251692017-09-13T15:21:24Z The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction Madden, Gary Bohlin, E. Kraipornsak, P. Tran, Thien spectrum allocation D44 FCC 700 MHz auctions license price L96 This article examines the prices paid for 700 MHz licenses in recent Federal Communications Commission auctions. Econometric modelling confirms the presence of economies of scale and scope in wireless spectrum valuations. That is, higher prices are recorded for areas with large populations, whilst lower prices are realized for geographically large areas. Also, smaller geographic license areas appear to meet bidders’ demand more effectively, and licenses in areas with high incomes are sold at higher prices. Not surprisingly, more strict deployment requirements and the presence of harmful technical interference reduce prices. Also, paired spectrum receives higher prices than unpaired spectrum. Interestingly, high minimum opening bids and upfront deposits are associated with higher prices. Finally, competitive bidding places upward pressure on prices. 2014 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/25169 10.1080/00036846.2014.889807 Taylor & Francis restricted |
| spellingShingle | spectrum allocation D44 FCC 700 MHz auctions license price L96 Madden, Gary Bohlin, E. Kraipornsak, P. Tran, Thien The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction |
| title | The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction |
| title_full | The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction |
| title_fullStr | The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction |
| title_short | The Determinants of Prices in the FCC’s 700 MHz Spectrum Auction |
| title_sort | determinants of prices in the fcc’s 700 mhz spectrum auction |
| topic | spectrum allocation D44 FCC 700 MHz auctions license price L96 |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/25169 |