Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignmen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Madden, Gary, Bohlin, E., Tran, Thien, Morey, A.
Format: Journal Article
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B.V., Formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers B.V. 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/22675
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author Madden, Gary
Bohlin, E.
Tran, Thien
Morey, A.
author_facet Madden, Gary
Bohlin, E.
Tran, Thien
Morey, A.
author_sort Madden, Gary
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.
first_indexed 2025-11-14T07:44:45Z
format Journal Article
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
institution_category Local University
last_indexed 2025-11-14T07:44:45Z
publishDate 2014
publisher Springer Science + Business Media B.V., Formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers B.V.
recordtype eprints
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-226752018-03-29T09:06:47Z Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry Madden, Gary Bohlin, E. Tran, Thien Morey, A. D82 L51 Spectrum licensing Market entry L96 Policy instruments Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry. 2014 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/22675 10.1007/s11151-013-9405-9 Springer Science + Business Media B.V., Formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers B.V. restricted
spellingShingle D82
L51
Spectrum licensing
Market entry
L96
Policy instruments
Madden, Gary
Bohlin, E.
Tran, Thien
Morey, A.
Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry
title Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry
title_full Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry
title_fullStr Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry
title_full_unstemmed Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry
title_short Spectrum Licensing, Policy Instruments and Market Entry
title_sort spectrum licensing, policy instruments and market entry
topic D82
L51
Spectrum licensing
Market entry
L96
Policy instruments
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/22675