Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study

This study examines the importance of the self-selection problem when evaluating returns to bidder firms around announcement events. Takeover announcements are not random because managers decide rationally whether to bid or not, which indicates announcements are timed; consequently, in the presence...

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Main Author: Akhtar, Farida
Format: Journal Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/15479
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author Akhtar, Farida
author_facet Akhtar, Farida
author_sort Akhtar, Farida
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description This study examines the importance of the self-selection problem when evaluating returns to bidder firms around announcement events. Takeover announcements are not random because managers decide rationally whether to bid or not, which indicates announcements are timed; consequently, in the presence of the sample selection problem, standard ordinary least square estimates are biased. Using a conditional model, the results indicate that after controlling for the self-selection bias effect, shareholders of bidder firms make normal returns. In sum, failing to account for sample selection bias may lead to erroneous conclusions about a bidder’s true economic wealth effects around an announcement event.
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
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publishDate 2015
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-154792017-09-13T13:41:03Z Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study Akhtar, Farida Sample selection bias This study examines the importance of the self-selection problem when evaluating returns to bidder firms around announcement events. Takeover announcements are not random because managers decide rationally whether to bid or not, which indicates announcements are timed; consequently, in the presence of the sample selection problem, standard ordinary least square estimates are biased. Using a conditional model, the results indicate that after controlling for the self-selection bias effect, shareholders of bidder firms make normal returns. In sum, failing to account for sample selection bias may lead to erroneous conclusions about a bidder’s true economic wealth effects around an announcement event. 2015 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/15479 10.1111/acfi.12149 Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia restricted
spellingShingle Sample selection bias
Akhtar, Farida
Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study
title Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study
title_full Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study
title_fullStr Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study
title_full_unstemmed Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study
title_short Conditional returns to shareholders of bidding Firms: an Australian study
title_sort conditional returns to shareholders of bidding firms: an australian study
topic Sample selection bias
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/15479