Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition

We study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will off...

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Main Authors: Jones, Roy, Mendelson, H.
Format: Journal Article
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11586
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author Jones, Roy
Mendelson, H.
author_facet Jones, Roy
Mendelson, H.
author_sort Jones, Roy
building Curtin Institutional Repository
collection Online Access
description We study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will offer only a single product. Competition leads to highly concentrated information-good markets, with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects. We study how the structure of the firms' cost functions drives our results. © 2011 INFORMS.
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institution Curtin University Malaysia
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spelling curtin-20.500.11937-115862017-09-13T14:53:51Z Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition Jones, Roy Mendelson, H. We study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will offer only a single product. Competition leads to highly concentrated information-good markets, with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects. We study how the structure of the firms' cost functions drives our results. © 2011 INFORMS. 2011 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11586 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1262 restricted
spellingShingle Jones, Roy
Mendelson, H.
Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition
title Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition
title_full Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition
title_fullStr Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition
title_full_unstemmed Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition
title_short Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and competition
title_sort information goods vs. industrial goods: cost structure and competition
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11586