Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming
In this paper, we derive and evaluate a new mathematical structure for market-based augmentation of the transmission system. The closed-form mathematical structure can capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of the transmission capacity. The Nash solution concept is employed to m...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Conference Paper |
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IEEE
2009
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11575 |
| _version_ | 1848747842805432320 |
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| author | Hesamzadeh, M. Biggar, D. Hosseinzadeh, N. Wolfs, Peter |
| author2 | IEEE |
| author_facet | IEEE Hesamzadeh, M. Biggar, D. Hosseinzadeh, N. Wolfs, Peter |
| author_sort | Hesamzadeh, M. |
| building | Curtin Institutional Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In this paper, we derive and evaluate a new mathematical structure for market-based augmentation of the transmission system. The closed-form mathematical structure can capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of the transmission capacity. The Nash solution concept is employed to model the price-quantity game among GenCos. The multiple Nash equilibria of the game are located through a characterisation of the problem in terms of minima of the R function. The worst Nash equilibrium is used in the mechanism of transmission augmentation. The worst Nash equilibrium is defined as the one which maximises the social cost, total generation cost + total value of lost load. Thorough analysis of a simple three-node network is presented to clearly highlight the mechanism of the derived mathematical structure from different perspectives. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T06:55:35Z |
| format | Conference Paper |
| id | curtin-20.500.11937-11575 |
| institution | Curtin University Malaysia |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T06:55:35Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | curtin-20.500.11937-115752017-10-02T02:27:29Z Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming Hesamzadeh, M. Biggar, D. Hosseinzadeh, N. Wolfs, Peter IEEE pricing power transmission economics power markets game theory In this paper, we derive and evaluate a new mathematical structure for market-based augmentation of the transmission system. The closed-form mathematical structure can capture both the efficiency benefit and competition benefit of the transmission capacity. The Nash solution concept is employed to model the price-quantity game among GenCos. The multiple Nash equilibria of the game are located through a characterisation of the problem in terms of minima of the R function. The worst Nash equilibrium is used in the mechanism of transmission augmentation. The worst Nash equilibrium is defined as the one which maximises the social cost, total generation cost + total value of lost load. Thorough analysis of a simple three-node network is presented to clearly highlight the mechanism of the derived mathematical structure from different perspectives. 2009 Conference Paper http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11575 IEEE fulltext |
| spellingShingle | pricing power transmission economics power markets game theory Hesamzadeh, M. Biggar, D. Hosseinzadeh, N. Wolfs, Peter Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming |
| title | Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming |
| title_full | Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming |
| title_fullStr | Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming |
| title_full_unstemmed | Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming |
| title_short | Derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming |
| title_sort | derivation of a mathematical structure for market-based transmission augmentation in oligopoly electricity markets using multilevel programming |
| topic | pricing power transmission economics power markets game theory |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11575 |