A Theoretical Perspective on Human Trafficking and Migration-Debt Contracts
This article develops an economic model of human trafficking and migration-debt contracts. A key feature of the theoretical model is the payment of additional sums beyond the initial contracted price to alter the trafficker’s queue order. These bribes are shown to be related to the level of effort a...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
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Routledge
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/10466 |
| Summary: | This article develops an economic model of human trafficking and migration-debt contracts. A key feature of the theoretical model is the payment of additional sums beyond the initial contracted price to alter the trafficker’s queue order. These bribes are shown to be related to the level of effort applied by the trafficker. The types of data needed to rigorously test the model are discussed, together with policy implications. |
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